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FUTURE HARM AS A CURRENT DISABILITY: 
INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR A RISK OF 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE RELAPSE UNDER ERISA 
Jonah Kind 
ABSTRACT—Disability insurance policies generally provide benefits to 
workers who are unable to work because they become addicted to drugs or 
alcohol. But what happens when the addict stops the substance abuse? 
Addiction is considered to be a lifelong disease with no real cure. Many 
addicts fear that a return to the workplace will trigger a relapse into 
substance abuse, for example when an anesthesiologist returns to work 
after becoming addicted to an anesthetic drug. This Note examines whether 
the risk of relapsing into substance abuse can ever qualify as a disability 
under conventional own-occupation group disability policies, which are 
subject to ERISA. Although courts have readily held that risks of physical 
harm, such as a heart attack, can constitute a disability because they render 
a policyholder unable to work, courts have thus far split when it comes to a 
risk of relapse into substance abuse. This Note argues that a risk of relapse 
into substance abuse can sometimes constitute a disability because there is 
no meaningful legal distinction between that and a risk of physical injury. 
To determine when these risks of future harm constitute a current 
disability, courts and ERISA plan administrators should assess whether the 
risk faced by the policyholder would prevent a reasonable person without 
disability insurance—and thus no reason to falsely claim an inability to 
work—from returning to employment. 
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For sixteen years, Dr. Julie Colby was a successful anesthesiologist in 
Massachusetts and a partner in her medical practice.1 But in July 2004, 
Colby was found unconscious in the hospital by a coworker.2 This was the 
first sign that she had become addicted to Fentanyl, an extremely strong—
approximately 100 times more potent than morphine3—and very addictive 
opioid that Colby administered as an anesthesiologist. She had been 
diverting Fentanyl from patients for her own use for quite some time.4 
Colby left her job and enrolled in a substance abuse treatment facility 
in Georgia in August 2004.5 There, Colby was diagnosed not only with 
Fentanyl dependence, but also with chronic depression, mild obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and a degenerative disc disease that caused her severe 
back pain.6 She remained in treatment at the facility in Georgia until 
November 2004 and remained under supervision on an outpatient basis 
 
1 Colby v. Union Sec. Ins. Co. & Mgmt. Co. for Merrimack Anesthesia Assocs. Long Term 
Disability Plan (Colby II), 705 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2013). 
2 Id. 
3 DRUG & CHEM. EVALUATION SECTION, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., FENTANYL (2013), 
available at http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/fentanyl.pdf. 
4 Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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thereafter.7 In 2005, her medical license was revoked.8 Soon after that, 
Colby experienced a series of distressing life events, including the deaths 
of her mother and mother-in-law and the death of her abusive ex-husband 
from a heroin overdose. Unsurprisingly, these events only worsened her 
depression.9 Nevertheless, all accounts suggest that Colby has not relapsed 
in her use of Fentanyl since her addiction was first revealed.10 
Though Colby’s addiction ended her ability to practice her profession, 
she was fortunate to have disability insurance. Like many Americans, 
Colby received disability coverage through her employer.11 Her policy was 
own-occupation long-term disability insurance, which is quite common.12 
Basically, the policy required the insurance company to pay her benefits if 
an injury or illness prevented her from performing the material duties of 
her regular occupation as a physician.13 After thirty-six months of paying 
benefits, the insurance company could cease payment under the terms of 
the contract unless Colby’s injury or sickness prevented her from 
performing any “gainful occupation for which [her] education, training, and 
experience qualifie[d her].”14 
Colby’s insurance company agreed to pay benefits during Colby’s stay 
in the treatment facility, as the policy’s definition of disability clearly 
included addiction.15 But when Colby left the treatment program, the 
insurer ceased payment of benefits.16 Though she was no longer using 
Fentanyl, Colby argued that she was disabled under the terms of the policy 
because a return to work as a physician, specifically in her field of 
anesthesiology, would lead to a significant risk of relapse.17 In short, she 
claimed that her history of addiction constituted a disability that prevented 
her from returning to an occupation where she would be surrounded by 
 
7 Id. 
8 Brief of Appellant Union Security Insurance Co. at 5, Colby II, 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 
11-2270), 2012 WL 605506, at *5. 
9 Colby II, 705 F.3d at 63 & n.8. 
10 Id. at 60. 
11 Michelle Andrews, Employers Increasingly Trimming or Cutting Disability Benefits, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/features/insuring-your-health/
michelle-andrews-on-disability-coverage.aspx. 
12 See 3 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 11:34 (6th ed. 2013). 
13 Colby II, 705 F.3d at 62. A second condition required Colby to “be under the regular care and 
attendance of a doctor.” Id. 
14 See Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 2d 365, 384 (D. Mass. 2011). 
15 Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60–62. 
16 Id. at 60. 
17 Id. at 62–63. Even if Colby wanted to return to practice, she would not have been allowed to 
because her license had been revoked. This is called a “legal disability,” which is not covered under 
most disability insurance policies. See Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 603 F. Supp. 2d 223, 245 (D. 
Mass. 2009). The existence of a “legal disability, however, does not negate a health-related disability on 
which such legal detriment is based.” Hannagan v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-795 
(FJS/DEP), 2010 WL 1235395, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010). 
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Fentanyl. The insurer disagreed, stating that a “risk for relapse is not the 
same as a current disability.”18 
After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies, Colby filed 
suit in federal district court in Massachusetts, arguing that the denial of 
benefits was arbitrary and capricious.19 Colby faced an uphill battle; most 
of the courts that had addressed the question of whether a risk of relapse 
into substance abuse could constitute a current disability had ruled that it 
could not,20 including the only circuit court that had ruled on the matter at 
that point—the Fourth Circuit, in Stanford v. Continental Casualty Co.21 
Luckily for Colby, the First Circuit disagreed with those other courts, 
holding that her risk of relapse into substance abuse upon a return to work 
was so high that it constituted a current disability under her policy.22 
In so ruling, the First Circuit created a circuit split significant not only 
to those that struggle with substance abuse but also to any person who is on 
the margin of qualifying for disability benefits. This Note will examine 
whether the risk of relapsing into substance abuse can ever qualify as a 
disability under a conventional own-occupation group disability policy and, 
if it can, what type of evidence should be required to show a current 
disability. Employers provide own-occupation group disability policies, so 
they are regulated by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA).23 Because these plans are regulated on a national 
scale, there must be a single national answer to this question. 
Though this question is narrow, it requires a much broader analysis of 
what the term “disability” means in such a policy. The policies themselves 
define disability as an injury or sickness that leaves the insured unable to 
perform the material duties of her own occupation.24 This definition leaves 
many questions unanswered, chief among them: when is a sick or injured 
person truly “unable to perform the material duties” of a job? Does the 
definition require physical inability—a broken arm that leaves a firefighter 
unable to carry a hose? Such a narrow definition would deny coverage to a 
worker who could physically perform the tasks of a job but would face a 
dire threat of a heart attack from performing them; it would also exclude 
the mentally ill. In contrast, an overly broad definition that provided 
coverage for anyone remotely afraid that his job could cause him injury 
 
18 Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60. 
19 See id. at 60–61. 
20 See, e.g., Forste v. Paul Revere Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 1:02-CV-1584 RLY TAB, 2004 
WL 3315386, at *12 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2004); Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 
1383–84 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (state law non-ERISA case); Laucks v. Provident Cos., No. 1CV971507, 
1999 WL 33320463, at *4–6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999). 
21 514 F.3d 354, 358–60 (4th Cir. 2008). 
22 Colby II, 705 F.3d at 66. 
23 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, and 
42 U.S.C.). 
24 See, e.g., Colby II, 705 F.3d at 62. 
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could lead people to take advantage of the system by applying for benefits 
instead of working. 
To date, courts have not established a coherent test to determine 
whether or not a particular risk of future injury constitutes a current 
disability. Although courts have readily found that a significant risk of 
future physical injury—such as a heart attack—may constitute a current 
disability,25 most courts have refused to so characterize a risk of relapse 
into substance abuse. Yet, these same courts have done little to distinguish 
between the risks of future physical injury and substance abuse relapse. 
This Note lays out a framework that courts—and ERISA plan 
administrators—can use to determine whether a risk of future injury 
constitutes a current disability. Courts should ask whether the risk faced 
would prevent a reasonable person without disability insurance from 
returning to work. Starting from the notion that some risks, such as a very 
high risk of a heart attack, clearly rise to the level of current disability, 
while others, such as the risk of contracting the common cold from a 
coworker, do not, this framework will draw a line between these two 
extremes of potential future injury. This test will focus on the quantitative 
likelihood that a relapse will occur upon a return to work, as well as the 
qualitative severity of the possible harm. Additionally, this Note analyzes 
the possibly perverse incentives facing someone with a risk of relapse into 
substance abuse, as well as concerns such as moral hazard, adverse 
selection, and the goals of disability insurance. Finally, this Note examines 
the most convincing distinction that has been made between physical 
relapse and relapse into substance abuse: that a person can relapse into 
substance abuse only if they “choose” to resume abuse. 
Using this framework, this Note argues that the risk of relapsing into 
substance abuse can rise to the level of current disability because there is 
no meaningful legal distinction between it and a risk of physical injury. 
This Note focuses on a specific type of relapse risk in order to demonstrate 
the way in which the framework functions: the risk that an anesthesiologist 
will relapse into an opioid26 addiction. This example is chosen both because 
such abuse is shockingly common27 and because it has been the context of 
 
25 See, e.g., Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 383 (3d Cir. 2003). 
26 The term “opioid” is distinct from the more common “opiate.” An opiate is a substance derived 
from the opium poppy plant, such as heroin, morphine, and codeine. The term opioid includes all 
opiates, as well as synthetic and semisynthetic substances that affect the brain in the same manner as 
opiates. Synthetic and semisynthetic opioids include fentanyl and oxycodone. See MICHAEL G. BISSEL 
& MICHAEL A. PEAT, Opioids 1: Opiates, in CLINICAL TOXICOLOGY TESTING: A GUIDE FOR 
LABORATORY PROFESSIONALS 140, 140 (Barbarajean Magnani et al. eds., 2012). 
27 Substance abuse has been called an “occupational hazard of being a physician, especially for 
anesthesiologists.” TASK FORCE ON CHEM. DEPENDENCE, AM. SOC’Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, MODEL 
CURRICULUM ON DRUG ABUSE AND ADDICTION FOR RESIDENTS IN ANESTHESIOLOGY, available at 
http://www.asahq.org/For-Members/Quality-and-Regulatory-Affairs/Practice-Management-
Publications/~/media/E64BA6191C474DD5946981FDF8DF501D.ashx. For example, in a 1987 study, 
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many cases dealing with the risk of relapse into substance abuse.28 The 
statistical likelihood of such a relapse and the consequences of relapse are 
often so severe as to truly bar a person from performing the material duties 
of her occupation. Furthermore, there are no convincing policy reasons that 
the risk of relapse into substance abuse should be barred as a disability. 
Finally, the idea that a person can only relapse into substance abuse after a 
choice to do so is overly simplistic and should not be a bar to benefit 
payments. 
This Note begins in Part I by reviewing the structure of insurance law, 
the language and typology of disability insurance policies, and the case law 
concerning risks of relapse for both physical illness and substance abuse. 
Part II develops a framework for analyzing whether a risk of future injury 
should constitute a current disability. In Part III, this framework is applied 
to risks of relapse into substance abuse, with a special focus on opioid 
addiction among anesthesiologists. This Note concludes that risk of 
substance abuse relapse can in some circumstances be considered a current 
disability for purposes of own-occupation group disability insurance plans. 
I. DISABILITY INSURANCE LAW AND THE RISK OF RELAPSE 
Insurance law in America is governed by a convoluted regulatory 
structure. Largely through historical accident,29 insurance is primarily 
regulated by the states; though state insurance regulation is quite similar 
from state to state, the existence of fifty different regulatory regimes makes 
it difficult to generalize in the realm of insurance law.30 Insurance provided 
through an employer, however, is also governed by ERISA, a federal 
statute that sometimes preempts state insurance laws.31 This Note avoids 
disparities in state laws by focusing mainly on ERISA-covered disability 
policies. Thus, a single legal standard can apply. Another problem with 
 
anesthesiologists made up 12% of physician admissions into drug treatment programs, though they 
constituted only 4% of physicians in the United States. E. Laura Wright et al., Opioid Abuse Among 
Nurse Anesthetists and Anesthesiologists, 80 AM. ASS’N NURSE ANESTHETISTS J. 120, 120 (2012). 
Opioids, especially Fentanyl and Sufentanil, are the “drug[s] of choice” for anesthesiologist addicts. 
Ethan O. Bryson & Jeffrey H. Silverstein, Addiction and Substance Abuse in Anesthesiology, 
109 ANESTHESIOLOGY 905, 905 (2008). The possible reasons for this high rate of opioid abuse are 
discussed in Bryson & Silverstein, supra. 
28 See, e.g., Colby II, 705 F.3d at 60; Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 
2008); Hellman v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1045–46 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); 
Brosnan v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Holzer v. 
MBL Life Assurance Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5834(TPG), 1999 WL 649004, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 
1999). 
29 David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regulation, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 723, 731 n.27 (1998). 
30 Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1999). 
31 Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: State Regulation of Insured Plans After Davila, 38 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 693, 695–96 (2005). 
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generalizing in this realm is that insurance law is at its core based on 
contract interpretation, making the precise language of a policy vitally 
important. Thankfully, the policies involved in risk-of-relapse cases contain 
language that is functionally identical, allowing for generalization across 
many policies.32 
A. The Basic Structure of Insurance Law and ERISA 
Insurance in the United States is primarily regulated through the states, 
mostly because insurance was considered to be legally beyond the reach of 
congressional action for many years. In Paul v. Virginia, an 1869 case, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not regulate insurance via its 
Commerce Clause power because “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a 
transaction of commerce.”33 This decision prompted the states to develop 
their own legal regimes for the regulation of insurance law.34 However, in 
1944 the Court reversed itself, coming to the logical conclusion in United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n that insurance is indeed 
commerce.35 Though this opened the door for Congress to displace the 
states in insurance regulation, Congress largely declined to exercise this 
option, mostly because insurance companies by this point favored state 
regulation.36 Instead, Congress passed the McCarran–Ferguson Act in 1945, 
which mandated that insurance would be regulated by the states and that no 
act of Congress would be construed to preempt a state insurance law unless 
the federal statute specifically related to insurance.37 
Although Congress has continued to allow states to be the primary 
regulators of most types of insurance, a huge change occurred in health and 
disability insurance regulation with the passage of ERISA in 1974. ERISA 
federalized the regulation of employee benefits, with the initial primary 
target being employee pension plans.38 At the last minute, however, 
Congress expanded the law to include insurance benefits provided by 
employers.39 This inclusion constituted a major shift in the insurance 
 
32 See infra Part I.B. 
33 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869). 
34 See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 24 (2d ed. 2008). 
35 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944). 
36 See Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran–Ferguson Act and Beyond, 
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 85–86 (1983). 
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012). 
38 Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete 
Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 105–06 & n.3 (2001). 
39 See ERISA: A Quarter Century of Providing Workers Health Insurance: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Emp’r–Emp. Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 106th Cong. 13 
(1999) (statement of Rand Rosenblatt, Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, 
Rutgers University Law School) (arguing that ERISA’s application to insurance was added as a last-
minute change in the conference committee and passed without reasonable scrutiny by the democratic 
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industry, as most health40 and disability insurance41 in the United States for 
those under sixty-five is provided by employers. 
The application of ERISA to insurance is quite complex and generally 
has created many problems for those employees whom ERISA was created 
to help. While ERISA in general must not “be construed to [preempt] any 
law of any State which regulates insurance,”42 ERISA also declares, 
“[n]either an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such 
a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company.”43 In essence, this 
means that ERISA does preempt all state insurance laws when the 
employer creates a trust into which it deposits money to pay employee 
insurance claims.44 Many employee benefit plans follow this route.45 
For the purposes of this Note, this preemption has two profound 
effects on a group disability insurance claimant.46 First, benefit denials are 
usually reviewed in federal rather than state court.47 Second, benefit denials 
are often judged according to a deferential standard of review.48 In 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,49 the Supreme Court ruled that 
judicial review of benefit denials under ERISA should use the abuse of 
discretion standard if “the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe 
the terms of the plan.”50 This is because ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty 
derived from trust law on administrators of all employee benefit plans,51 
and review of the decisions of trustees is governed by the abuse of 
 
process, as the conference bill was passed without serious discussion of the significance of this 
addition). 
40 Elise Gould, 2010 Marks Another Year of Decline for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 
Coverage, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/2010-marks-year-
decline-employer-sponsored. 
41 Andrews, supra note 11. 
42 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
43 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
44 BAKER, supra note 34, at 131. 
45 Id. at 132. 
46 It also has one profound effect not explored herein: members of any employer-sponsored health 
or disability benefit plan, whether or not in trust form, are unable to collect punitive damages or tort 
damages for wrongful death or personal injury. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52–57 
(1987); see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 214–15 (2004) (invalidating Texas law that 
sought to avoid this aspect of ERISA by providing a breach of contract remedy); Andrews-Clarke v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 55–56 (D. Mass. 1997) (criticizing this aspect of ERISA). 
47 Sandra J. Weiland, ERISA’s Silence: Standards of Review in Deemed Denial Employment Benefit 
Claims, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 613–15 (2005). 
48 See, e.g., Colby II, 705 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 2013). Benefit approvals, of course, are never 
challenged in court because the insurer itself is the party approving payment. 
49 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
50 Id. at 115. 
51 Id. at 110. 
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discretion standard.52 In ERISA cases, this standard is equivalent to the 
familiar arbitrary and capricious standard.53 
However, “trust law presupposes that the trustee . . . will be 
disinterested, in the sense of having no personal stake in the trust assets.”54 
Yet, in most instances, the administrator of an ERISA insurance plan is an 
employee of the insurance company providing the benefits or is otherwise 
aligned with the employer.55 The administrator therefore has a conflict of 
interest created by a clear incentive to deny benefits: “[E]very dollar saved 
by the administrator on behalf of his employer is a dollar in [the 
employer]’s pocket.”56 Not only is the person evaluating claims the same 
person that would have to pay approved benefits, but his decisions also 
receive significant deference from courts.57 To counteract this conflict of 
interests, courts have adopted “a sliding scale according to which the plan 
administrator’s decision must be more objectively reasonable and 
supported by more substantial evidence as the incentive for abuse of 
discretion is shown to increase.”58 ERISA claimants, however, still face a 
difficult battle in court, because “the existence of a conflict of interest is 
only one factor to be considered in reviewing a denial of benefits for abuse 
of discretion.”59 
Finally, insurance law is, at its core, contract law.60 While ERISA 
slightly modifies this arrangement for employment-based insurance, 
contract law still provides the general guidelines for insurance policy 
interpretation.61 One key doctrine of contract law that courts typically apply 
to insurance contracts is contra proferentem (“against the drafter”), under 
which a court will “interpret ambiguous insurance policies in favor of 
policyholders.”62 
 
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). 
53 Colby II, 705 F.3d at 61. 
54 John H. Langbein, Essay, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The UNUM/Provident Scandal and 
Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1326 (2007). 
55 Id. at 1326–27. 
56 Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
57 For a thorough criticism of this arrangement, see Langbein, supra note 54, at 1327. 
58 Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Fought v. UNUM Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curium) (discussing the sliding scale 
approach). 
59 Stanford, 514 F.3d at 357. 
60 BAKER, supra note 34, at 29. 
61 Id. at 30. 
62 Id.; see also Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601–03 (2d. Cir. 1947) 
(Hand, J.) (applying the doctrine of contra proferentem). 
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B. Disability Insurance Policies 
The main goal of disability insurance is to protect the income of the 
insured in the event that physical or mental illness interferes with the 
insured’s ability to work.63 Another goal of disability insurance is the 
rehabilitation of disabled claimants.64 Despite the importance of these 
goals, and the fact that people are quite likely to become disabled in their 
lifetime,65 “[d]isability insurance tends to be one of the more overlooked 
forms of insurance,” with just under half of young American workers 
covered by short-term disability insurance (coverage for less than two 
years), and even fewer with long-term disability insurance.66 
The main reasons for disability insurance’s relative unpopularity are 
the twin concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection, which make the 
price of an individual disability insurance policy quite high.67 Insurance 
companies are willing to sell policies only at high prices because of the 
concern that insured people will act in a way likely to lead to injury or will 
fake an injury (moral hazard), or that only people who know they face a 
high risk of injury will purchase disability insurance (adverse selection). 
Another reason for low enrollment is that most Americans are entitled to 
public disability benefits through Social Security, leading people to 
discount the value of individual coverage.68 However, Social Security 
provides benefits only to those who have an “inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity.”69 Because most disabilities are not covered by 
this strict definition, most workers who sustain an injury that prevents them 
from continuing in their job will suffer a substantial income loss unless 
they have personal coverage.70 
The majority of disability insurance coverage is for “total disability.”71 
Such coverage provides benefits when an illness or injury makes the 
 
63 Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: 
Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 81 (1993). 
64 See Stanford, 514 F.3d at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); David M. Richards, Understanding 
Today’s Disability Insurance Contracts, COLO. LAW., Mar. 2011, at 69, 71. 
65 Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3261 (“Of recent entrants to the 
labor force, almost four in ten men (37 percent) and three in ten women (31 percent) will become 
disabled or die before reaching the full retirement age.”). 
66 Kimberly Palmer, Why You Probably Need More Disability Insurance, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 9, 
2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2013/10/09/why-you-probably-need-
more-disability-insurance. 
67 BAKER, supra note 34, at 177. 
68 Social Security Basic Facts, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (July 26, 2013), http://www.ssa.gov/
pressoffice/basicfact.htm (noting that approximately 91% of workers between twenty-one and sixty-
four years old that are in employment covered by Social Security are eligible for benefits if long-term 
disability occurs). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1) (2006). 
70 See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63, at 84. 
71 Id. at 81. 
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policyholder unable to perform the major duties of either her own 
occupation or any reasonable alternative occupation, depending on the type 
of policy purchased.72 Some disability insurance plans also cover “partial 
disability,” which provides benefits if the insured is unable to perform one 
or more of the essential tasks of his or her (or any) occupation.73 Disability 
plans can also be differentiated between individual plans and group plans—
those provided through an employer. 
Roughly speaking, there are three different types of private total 
disability insurance policies. First, and most common, is “own-
occupation”74 coverage, which provides benefits if the insured is unable to 
perform the material duties of her specific occupation due to illness or 
injury.75 The second type is “general disability” coverage, which pays 
benefits only if injury or illness leaves the insured unable to perform the 
material duties of any occupation.76 Some general disability policies are 
more lenient, requiring an inability to work in any occupation for “which 
[the insured’s] education, training, and experience qualifies [the insured].”77 
The third type is a “hybrid” policy, in which a period of own-occupation 
coverage is followed by a longer period of general disability coverage.78 
Own-occupation coverage is the most expensive of the three because it 
is the broadest; any injury that causes inability to perform the insured’s 
own work will constitute a disability, even if the insured is able to do 
countless other jobs. Additionally, it is very prone to moral hazard because 
claimants have no incentive to return to the workforce in an otherwise 
equal or lesser paying occupation. That is the reason for hybrid policies. 
This Note is primarily concerned with group total own-occupation 
disability policies for several reasons. First, group policies are covered by 
ERISA,79 making it easier to compare cases and develop a legal standard. 
Group policies are also much more common than individual ones.80 
 
72 See 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 147:2 (3d ed. 2012). 
73 Id. § 147:7; see also AM. COUNCIL ON LIFE INSURERS, DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE: 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY 4 (2007). Partial disability coverage is rare and 
quite expensive due to the significant moral hazard implications of allowing an insured to continue 
working, yet also apply for benefits based on a supposed inability to perform certain work-related tasks. 
See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63, at 110–11. 
74 See, e.g., 17 FLORIDA INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 38:4 (2013–2014 ed. 2013). 
75 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 72, § 147:107. 
76 See id. § 147:40. 
77 Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 818 F. Supp. 2d 365, 384 (D. Mass. 2011). 
78 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 72, § 147:107. 
79 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43, 57 (1987). 
80 See David J. Christianson, Disability Income Insurance: The Private Market and the Impact of 
Genetic Testing, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40, 41–42 (Supp. 2007). Group policies are less expensive 
because they alleviate adverse selection problems. See Karl Kronebusch, Medicaid and the Politics of 
Groups: Recipients, Providers, and Policy Making, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 839, 856 (1997). 
Similar to an insurance mandate, group insurance that covers all workers broadens the risk pool by 
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Second, total disability coverage is more common than partial disability 
insurance,81 is implicated in more of the case law considered herein, and is 
a much more clear-cut issue in terms of coverage: the insured is either 
entitled to benefits or is not—there is no added difficulty of determining 
the amount of benefits to which the insured is entitled. Finally, only own-
occupation policies are considered because former addicts will almost 
always be able to perform the material duties of some occupation, even if a 
risk of relapse does not allow them to return to their former occupation.82 
Though the definition of “disability” in insurance policies can differ in 
many ways, the substance of coverage is materially the same among almost 
all group total own-occupation disability policies. Disagreements in the 
case law regarding the risk of relapse do not seem to stem from differences 
in policy language but rather from more fundamental notions of what this 
type of policy is meant to cover. Thus, it is possible for the purposes of this 
Note to generalize across the policies at issue in the case law and define a 
“disability” as “injury or sickness caus[ing] physical or mental impairment 
to such a degree of severity that [the insured is] . . . continuously unable to 
perform the material and substantial duties of [the insured’s] regular 
occupation.”83 Basically, this definition requires the insurer to pay benefits 
when the insured is unable to return to work because of injury or sickness. 
C. Judicial Decisions Regarding the Risk of Relapse 
Courts have a mixed record when considering cases in which there is a 
risk of physical or mental illness associated with return to work. When 
analyzing these cases it is important to remember the more lenient standard 
of review that applies to benefit denials made by ERISA plan 
administrators.84 In most ERISA cases, the reviewing court may overturn a 
benefit denial only if it is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious, meaning 
that there was no reasonable basis for the decision. 
It is settled law that the risk of relapse of a physical disease can 
constitute a disability.85 The leading case for this proposition, which the 
Stanford86 and Colby87 courts both cited approvingly, is the Third Circuit 
 
including those with both a high and low risk of loss purchase insurance. See Brendan S. Maher, The 
Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1770–74 (2011). 
81  See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63. 
82 See Colby II, 705 F.3d 58, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2013). 
83 Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 2008) (some alterations in original). 
84 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
85 See 31 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 187.05[A], at 214 (2d ed. 2007) 
(“The insured is considered to be permanently and totally disabled when it is impossible to work 
without hazarding his or her health or risking his or her life.”). 
86 514 F.3d at 358. 
87 705 F.3d. at 66. 
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case Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.88 The plaintiff in 
Lasser was a surgeon with an ERISA-regulated, own-occupation disability 
group policy which not only covered complete inability to work but also 
provided benefits if a disability allowed the policyholder to perform only 
some of the material duties of his occupation.89 After suffering a heart 
attack, the plaintiff followed his doctor’s orders to decrease his stress level 
by reducing his patient load by half, and ceasing to perform emergency 
surgery and being “on-call” at night and on weekends.90 Though the insurer 
initially provided disability benefits, it then terminated his benefits on the 
ground that he was not disabled.91 
The Third Circuit held that the benefit denial was arbitrary and 
capricious.92 The majority quickly dispensed with the idea that the risk of 
future injury is insufficient to constitute a current disability, stating, 
“[W]hether risk of future effects creates a present disability depends on the 
probability of the future risk’s occurrence.”93 The dissent conceded the 
possibility that a risk of relapse could be a current disability, but argued 
that a policyholder should have to quantify this risk in order to be granted 
benefits.94 The majority disagreed, stating that it would be too difficult for a 
plaintiff to provide evidence of statistical risk. Thus, the majority accepted 
numerous doctors’ qualitative reports stating that the plaintiff’s risk of 
future injury was high—claims not convincingly refuted by the insurer—as 
sufficient and awarded the plaintiff benefits.95 Other courts have similarly 
held that a risk of a heart attack can constitute a current disability.96 
While risk of relapse of a physical disease is accepted as a disability, 
courts differ sharply on whether risk of relapse into substance abuse can be 
a disability. Although only two circuits have considered the issue, many 
federal district courts have analyzed these claims. About half of these 
courts held that risk of substance abuse relapse can never constitute a 
current disability.97 The other half held that risk of relapse can constitute a 
 
88 344 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2003). 
89 Id. at 383–84. 
90 Id. at 383. 
91 Id. at 384. 
92 Id. at 383. 
93 Id. at 391 n.12. 
94 Id. at 397 (Garth, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at 391 (majority opinion). 
96 See, e.g., Kent v. Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 146 F. App’x 862, 864 (9th Cir. 2005); Napoli 
v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 78 F. App’x 787, 789 (2d Cir. 2003); Saliamonas v. CNA, Inc., 127 F. 
Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Buffaloe v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 5:99-CV-710-
BR(3), 2000 WL 33951195, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2000). 
97 See, e.g., Forste v. Paul Revere Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 1:02-CV-1584 RLY TAB, 2004 
WL 3315386, at *12 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2004); Allen v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 
1383–84 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (state law non-ERISA case); Laucks v. Provident Cos., No. 1CV971507, 
1999 WL 33320463, at *4–6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1999). 
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present disability, though one of these courts held that the plaintiff at bar 
had not shown sufficient evidence that he was in fact likely to relapse to 
survive a motion for judgment on the administrative record.98 The others 
found either that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the risk was 
high enough,99 that the denial was arbitrary and capricious in light of the 
evidence,100 or, under de novo review, that the policy covered risk of 
relapse.101 
A circuit court took up this issue for the first time in Stanford v. 
Continental Casualty Co.102 The plaintiff, a nurse anesthetist, became 
addicted to Fentanyl.103 After successfully completing an addiction 
treatment program, he quickly relapsed.104 The plaintiff returned to his job 
the following year after completing another addiction treatment program 
but again relapsed when he began taking Fentanyl at work.105 Yet again, he 
completed an addiction rehabilitation program and this time did not relapse. 
His insurer, which had paid him benefits during treatment, terminated those 
benefits in January 2005 after he had completed his treatment program, 
after being informed by a registered nurse consultant that the plaintiff “no 
longer suffered any impairment that would prevent him from performing 
the duties of his occupation.”106 The plaintiff sought administrative review 
of the denial, claiming that he remained at risk for a relapse if he returned 
to work. The insurer denied his appeal, stating that, “the policy does not 
cover potential risk.”107 
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the insurance company’s claim that a 
risk of relapse into addiction could never constitute a present disability.108 
 
98 See Price v. Disability RMS, No. 06-10251-GAO, 2008 WL 763255, at *21–22 (D. Mass. Mar. 
21, 2008). “A motion for a judgment on the record in an ERISA case, although similar to an ordinary 
summary judgment motion, differs in that the non-moving party is not entitled to the usual inferences in 
its favor.” Id. at *1 (quoting Orndorf v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 510, 517 (1st Cir. 2005)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 2:07-cv-00944-MCE-DAD, 2010 WL 
315025, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010); Hellman v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 
1049–50 (M.D. Tenn. 2001); Holzer v. MBL Life Assurance Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5834(TPG), 1999 WL 
649004, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1999); Brosnan v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 31 F. Supp. 
2d 460, 464–65 (E.D. Pa. 1998); see also Berry v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 21 So. 3d 385, 395–96 
(La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding under state law that whether risk of relapse into substance abuse 
constituted a current disability is a genuine issue of material fact). 
100 See, e.g., Kufner v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 785, 797 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
101 Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, No. 98 C 50422, 2001 WL 1110489, at *4, *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 20, 2001). 
102 514 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2008). 
103 Id. at 355. 




108 Id. at 358, 360. 
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The court held that the plaintiff was “not physically disabled or mentally 
impaired . . . [and] is physically and mentally capable of performing [the] 
job [of a nurse anesthetist].”109 The court’s analysis focused on 
differentiating this type of risk from the risk of future physical illness: 
[T]he risk of a heart attack is different from the risk of relapse into drug use. A 
doctor with a heart condition who enters a high-stress environment like an 
operating room “risks relapse” in the sense that the performance of his job 
duties may cause a heart attack. But an anesthetist with a drug addiction who 
enters an environment where drugs are readily available “risks relapse” only 
in the sense that the ready availability of drugs increases his temptation to 
resume his drug use. Whether he succumbs to that temptation remains his 
choice; the heart-attack prone doctor has no such choice.110 
Though asserting that it “[did] not mean to suggest that it is easy to 
overcome an addict’s temptation,” the court found that “the availability of 
this choice . . . distinguishes” these types of risks of relapse from 
completely choiceless relapses like heart attacks.111 
The court further stated that the split among lower court decisions 
regarding the risk of relapse into addiction was proof that reasonable minds 
can disagree over whether this risk constitutes a current disability. 
Therefore, the insurer’s conclusion could not be considered unreasonable.112 
Finally, the court addressed the contention that its decision created a 
perverse incentive structure in which an addict who continues to abuse 
drugs would continue to receive benefits but would lose those benefits 
upon becoming sober. The court dismissed this argument because it 
“operates on a false assumption, namely that disability benefits are a sort of 
reward for sobriety. In fact, sobriety’s reward is the creation of 
innumerable opportunities that were closed to [the plaintiff] as long as he 
continued to use drugs,” even if these new opportunities do not include 
returning to his previous job.113 
Judge Wilkinson wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion. He argued that 
coverage for risk of relapse was plainly called for under the terms of the 
policy and that the majority had created an unwritten exception to the 
coverage. Interpreting the contractual language, “[a]ll agree that [the 
plaintiff] cannot presently return to work in safety, and if we ask why not, 
the answer must be some existing, not future, impairment.”114 Wilkinson 
pointed out that “potential risk,” which the insurer claimed the policy did 
not cover, is redundant: “‘potential risk’ is just risk.”115 The insurer may 
 
109 Id. at 359. 
110 Id. at 358. 
111 Id. at 358 n.4. 
112 Id. at 359. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 362 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 361. 
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have meant that the policy does not cover risks of relapse, but such an 
interpretation would not allow coverage for an increased risk of a heart 
attack. Because that type of risk is undisputedly covered by the policy, so 
must a risk of relapse into addiction, as mental and physical disorders are 
treated equally under the plan.116 The dissent also noted the perverse 
incentive inherent to the majority’s holding, arguing that requiring the 
claimant “to relapse into addiction or lose his benefits would also thwart 
the very purpose for which disability plans exist: to help people overcome 
medical adversity if possible, and otherwise to cope with it.”117 Finally, 
Wilkinson took issue with the majority’s contention that the presence of a 
choice differentiated risks of physical and addictive relapse, arguing that 
this was “legally ungrounded” and “appears to rest on moral considerations 
of choice and temptation on the one hand, and medical considerations of 
physical inability on the other, neither of which are to be found in the 
language of a Plan that puts addiction squarely on all fours with other 
impairments.”118 
The only other circuit court to address this question was the First 
Circuit in Colby v. Union Security Insurance Co. & Management Co. for 
Merrimack Anesthesia Associates Long Term Disability Plan.119 The First 
Circuit overturned Union Security’s denial of benefits to Dr. Colby as 
arbitrary and capricious, explicitly agreeing with Judge Wilkinson’s 
reasoning.120 Not only did the First Circuit rule that the risk of relapse into 
addiction could constitute a current disability, it also held that the 
overwhelming evidence in this instance could not support a denial of 
benefits.121 The court found, “[G]iven the language of the plan, 
categorically excluding risk of relapse as a source of disability is simply 
unreasonable.”122 Given her history of abuse and physician testimony that 
she was likely to relapse upon a return to anesthesiology, Colby was clearly 
unable to perform the duties of her occupation, and there was no exclusion 
in the policy that exempted such a disability from coverage.123 Moreover, 
the majority stated, there is no way to create a principled distinction 
between a risk of physical relapse and a risk of relapse into addiction. In 
either circumstance, the insured may be physically able to perform the 
 
116 Id. at 363. 
117 Id. at 362. 
118 Id. at 363. 
119 Colby II, 705 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013). 
120 Id. at 66–67. For the factual background of this case, see supra Part I. 
121 Id. at 65–66, 68. The district court had previously remanded this case to the insurance 
administrator, ordering it to consider the factual basis of Colby’s claim. Union Security then hardened 
its position, maintaining that risk of relapse could never constitute a disability. Id. at 61. Without this 
prior history of remand, it is likely that the circuit court would have simply remanded the case to the 
administrator instead of ruling itself that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 68. 
122 Id. at 65. 
123 Id. 
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functions of his or her occupation; nevertheless the “risk of relapse is 
prohibitively impairing and thus becomes, for all practical purposes, a 
current disability.”124 The court did not discuss the possible distinction 
caused by one’s “choice” to relapse into addiction. 
II. RISK OF FUTURE INJURY AS A CURRENT DISABILITY 
Currently, the courts lack a coherent way of analyzing whether a risk 
of future injury from employment constitutes a current disability. This 
leads to outcomes that are inconsistent across courts and also to arbitrary 
and illogical line drawing between different factual circumstances. In part, 
this is caused by the contractual nature of disability insurance as well as the 
deference given to ERISA plan administrators.125 Courts are understandably 
reluctant to define the meaning of terms or phrases across all contractual 
agreements because context is key in deciding the meaning that parties 
wish to attach to specific language. Furthermore, the deferential nature of 
ERISA review requires judges to uphold reasonable interpretations of 
policy language. 
Yet there are several good reasons for courts to develop a more 
coherent way of analyzing these types of claims. Although courts generally 
do not define specific words across contracts, they sometimes develop 
doctrines giving certain phrases a specified legal effect, and as a general 
rule try to construe contracts that are similar in the same way.126 In the 
disability insurance context, the definition of disability is substantially 
identical across almost every policy.127 This fact, combined with the large 
number of these cases that courts review, makes the development of a 
framework of analysis a feasible and necessary task in order to avoid 
inequitable inconsistency. Moreover, deference to administrative decisions 
does not require courts to completely relinquish any role in determining 
what should be covered under a given insurance policy. The framework 
developed here is not intended to help judges determine whether a benefit 
denial was correct; rather, it will guide judges in their proper role of 
analyzing whether an administrator’s decision was reasonable. 
A. Should a Risk of Future Injury Ever Be a Current Disability? 
As with any question of insurance coverage, analysis must begin with 
the policy language. In an occupational disability policy, the insured is 
considered disabled if an injury or illness prevents her from performing the 
 
124 Id. at 66. 
125 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
126 See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Under California contract 
law, the phrase ‘provided that’ typically denotes a condition.”). 
127 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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material duties of her occupation.128 Thus, a risk of future injury is a 
disability only if the risk functionally prevents the insured from working. 
Insurance policies are structured to provide benefits only if a certain 
event happens.129 But it is clear that insurers do not provide benefits simply 
because there is a risk that something will happen. Insurance companies 
have used this latter point as an argument against providing benefits for 
risk of relapse, stating that their policies do not cover “potential risk.”130 In 
his Stanford dissent, Judge Wilkinson pointed out that this phrase is 
redundant.131 Although he is literally correct, he is conceptually mistaken. 
Insurance is all about risk. A policy pays out if a specified event happens; 
the risk is simply the probability that this event happens.132 Insurance 
companies are correct to point out that they do not have to pay for a 
“potential risk” and do not have to pay even if the likelihood of an event 
rises substantially. However, this does not necessarily foreclose coverage 
for risk of future injury under a disability policy, because an increase in the 
likelihood of future injury can itself constitute an event—a disability—that 
prevents the policyholder from returning to work. The difficulty comes in 
distinguishing an increase in risk that simply makes a future disability more 
likely from one that is in and of itself a disability. 
A framework for analyzing this question must start with the somewhat 
controversial assumption that a risk of future injury can ever constitute a 
current disability. Insurers have argued that it cannot because this risk does 
not prevent someone from physically performing the duties of her 
occupation, but courts that have considered the question have correctly 
rejected such a narrow conception of disability.133 
The primary support for this assumption is the fact that multiple courts 
have explicitly held that risk of future injury can constitute a current 
disability, usually in the context of a risk of heart attack.134 These courts 
seem intuitively correct—few would argue that someone is able to perform 
the material duties of her profession if a return to work would entail a large 
chance of death. It is blackletter law that disability coverage applies where 
a person is able to perform the physical tasks of a job, but doing so would 
put them at unacceptable risk because of their physical condition.135 
 
128 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
129 See BAKER, supra note 34, at 2. 
130 See, e.g., Stanford v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 514 F.3d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 2008). 
131 Id. at 361 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
132 See BAKER, supra note 34, at 2. 
133 See supra notes 85–88. 
134 See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
135 See 31 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, supra note 85; Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 F. 
Supp. 2d 619, 628 (D.N.J. 2001), aff’d, 344 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Because mental illness is covered under disability policies just as much as 
physical illness,136 a risk of relapse should be similarly covered. 
Coverage for risk of future injury is also supported by the fact that a 
risk of future harm is often accepted as a form of current injury in another 
area of the law—tort law. Three tort causes of action all use the idea of 
“probabilistic injuries” as a basis for recovery.137 “Loss of chance” is a 
cause of action that allows recovery for medical malpractice that affects a 
patient’s likelihood of survival.138 “Increased risk of disease” is a tort that 
allows recovery for exposure to toxic substances that causes an increased 
risk of future disease—even if no symptoms are currently present and 
injury is not certain.139 A similar cause of action exists for fear of future 
disease from exposure to toxic substances.140 Although a majority of courts 
require the risk of future injury to rise above 50% before it is compensable, 
some have allowed for partial recovery where the risk is still below 50%.141 
These causes of action and courts’ treatment of them show that courts are 
willing to accept future risks as current injuries in the context of tort law. 
B. Reasonable Non-insured Person Test 
Although some risks of future injury can constitute a current disability, 
most cannot. Everyone is at some risk for every kind of disability. Just by 
going into work every day, people expose themselves to the possibility of 
countless injuries: car crashes during the commute, exposure to 
communicable diseases from coworkers, and physical injuries inherent to 
job duties. Yet few people would argue that these risks, which could be 
avoided by staying at home in bed, constitute a disability; they do not 
prevent a person from performing the duties of her occupation. These risks 
are the reason that people purchase disability insurance, not the basis for 
benefits. On the other hand, most people would concede that a person truly 
is unable to perform the duties of his occupation if his risk of a severe heart 
 
136 See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 63; see also, e.g., Colby v. Assurant Emp. Benefits, 603 
F. Supp. 2d 223, 245 (D. Mass. 2009). (“[T]he explicit terms of Dr. Colby’s Plan do not distinguish 
between physical and mental disabilities. In other words, an individual who becomes disabled because 
of a mental illness is equally entitled to benefits as an individual who becomes disabled as a result of a 
physical illness.”). 
137 Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 154–55 (1992). 
138 Id. at 155. 
139 Id. at 156–57. 
140 Id. at 154, 157. 
141 See generally Judith M. Dworkin & Janet E. Kornblatt, Plaintiffs’ Expanding Concepts of 
Compensation and the Courts’ Responses, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 487, 504 (1994) (surveying a liberalizing 
trend of reduced burdens on tort plaintiffs in establishing liability, causation, and damages). The 50% 
requirement stems from civil litigation’s requirement that causation be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence, or in other words that there is more than a 50% chance that the defendant’s negligent 
conduct will result in future injury in the plaintiff. See Shelly Brinker, Comment, Opening the Door to 
the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort 
Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289, 1304 (1999). 
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attack would rise from 40% to 90% upon returning to work after recovering 
from a first heart attack. 
The best way to understand the difference between these situations is 
that in the case of minor job-associated risks, a reasonable person would, 
absent the availability of disability payments, decide to continue working. 
In contrast, a reasonable person would not continue working if the work 
would likely lead to a heart attack, even if the person had no disability 
insurance. This inquiry into reasonableness is what insurers, as well as 
reviewing judges, should use to determine whether a risk of future injury 
constitutes a current disability. 
There are three main reasons that insurers and courts should use this 
reasonable insured test. First, it is the best way to faithfully implement the 
language in disability policies. Assessing coverage under these policies 
requires a determination of whether the claimant is able to perform the 
material duties of her occupation. How better to answer this question than 
by inquiring whether a reasonable person could perform those duties? A 
subjective test would be unworkable because it is impossible to know what 
the claimant would choose to do without the availability of benefits. A 
subjective test would unfairly punish or reward individuals with higher and 
lower risk tolerances, respectively, even though they signed the same 
standard contract as everyone else. Moreover, only a reasonable person test 
would allow coverage decisions to apply generally. In interpreting 
contracts, courts generally look to the reasonable meaning of terms. When 
more than one reasonable interpretation is possible, insurance law abides 
by the doctrine of contra proferentem, meaning that the reasonable 
interpretation of the insured will be accepted.142 Using a test other than the 
reasonable person test would allow insurers to defeat the reasonable 
expectations of insureds. 
Second, this test maintains the goals of disability insurance while 
avoiding the perverse incentives that insurance coverage can sometimes 
create. Disability insurance is meant to supply income to people when they 
are unable to work without giving them an incentive not to work—that is, 
minimizing moral hazard. In the disability context, the main source of 
moral hazard is obvious: insureds have an incentive to stop working if they 
can convince the insurer that they are disabled. 
Thus, it is important that the definition of disability in a policy is broad 
enough to cover situations in which people have a legitimate inability to 
work, while simultaneously minimizing opportunities for people to fake 
disability. It is for this reason that the reasonable person test considers the 
actions of a reasonable person without disability insurance. By considering 
this question, it is possible to determine if a reasonable person would be 
 
142 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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unable to work without the inquiry being tainted by the perverse incentives 
caused by the availability of insurance benefits.143 
Third, the reasonable person standard is widely used in tort and 
criminal law, making the test relatively easy to apply. Though determining 
the actions of a reasonable person is far from straightforward, courts should 
be comfortable with the standard. The main inherent problem of a 
reasonable person standard is inconsistency of application.144 Although it is 
true that administrators and courts may sometimes disagree about what a 
reasonable person would do in a given situation, this test provides the best 
possible framework in an area of law that currently has no guiding 
principle and in which a more precise standard is unworkable. 
C. Qualitative–Quantitative Analysis of Future Risk 
The next question is the way in which a judge or administrator should 
determine whether or not a reasonable person would decide to work in the 
absence of disability coverage. The crucial factor to analyze in considering 
whether a risk of relapse can be a current disability is the gravity of the 
risk—how likely is it that a former addict will actually relapse after 
returning to work, and what are the consequences of a relapse? If a person 
is unlikely to relapse and the health effects of a relapse are minor, it is safe 
to say that a reasonable person would not forgo a return to work absent the 
receipt of benefits. In such a case, the insured should not be considered 
disabled, because it can be inferred that the person is actually able to 
perform the material duties of her occupation. If the insured is claiming 
benefits, it is likely that the availability of disability benefits, not a fear of 
relapse, is preventing the insured from returning to work. 
Conversely, when the risk of relapse is high and the possible health 
effects of relapse severe, it can be convincingly argued that the risk 
constitutes a current disability because it effectively prevents any 
reasonable person from performing the material duties of his profession. 
Courts use this type of reasoning to hold that a heightened risk of a heart 
attack can constitute a current disability.145 Heart attacks can cause severe 
health effects and may lead to death.146 Thus, one may assume that a person 
 
143 A decision to return to work caused by financial hardship does not necessarily mean that a 
person is not disabled. Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 392 (3d Cir. 2003). “A 
desperate person might force himself to work despite an illness that everyone agreed was totally 
disabling.” Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
144 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court’s Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What Is 
a “Seizure” of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619, 
642–45 (1990). 
145 See supra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
146 Approximately 4.7% of heart attacks are fatal. Heart Attack Victims Get Treated Faster, but 
Death Rate Stays the Same, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/heart-
attack-victims-get-treated-faster-but-death-rate-stays-the-same/. 
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who faces a high risk of heart attack from a return to work would choose 
not to return to work because of the health risks, regardless of the 
availability of disability benefits. 
This type of inquiry into the gravity of the risk of relapse is therefore 
both qualitative and quantitative, including both the harm and the 
likelihood of relapse. Thus far, however, courts considering coverage for a 
risk of relapse have generally not considered this type of specific evidence. 
Instead, they have focused on vague physician statements such as the claim 
the insured “could not [return to his work as an orthopedic surgeon full-
time] without exposing himself to a high degree of risk,”147 or “is at high 
risk of relapse should she return to the practice of anesthesia,”148 and an 
assumption that a relapse into addiction or a heart attack would be harmful. 
No court has considered quantitative evidence of the risk of relapse, which 
can vary significantly among different types of addictions.149 The court in 
Lasser, over a dissent, specifically found that requiring this type of 
evidence would raise the bar too high for the claimant.150 Instead, the 
claimant could merely provide physicians’ reports “suggest[ing] that the 
risk is high,”151 ignoring the dissent’s convincing argument that “stress, 
while it may affect cardiac patients, does not necessarily incapacitate them, 
or prevent them from successfully returning to, and performing, stressful 
jobs, i.e., Vice President Dick Cheney.”152 As the dissent correctly argues, 
only if the claimant “quantif[ies] that risk [can] the ERISA decision 
maker . . . determine if it constitutes a present disability.”153 Courts have 
also failed to examine how harmful a relapse would actually be. While a 
second heart attack could obviously be extremely harmful, the 
consequences of other relapses are less clear. The negative effects of a 
second paper cut or bout of the common cold are miniscule; even among 
addictions, there are likely to be widely diverse consequences between a 
relapse into different substances. 
There are two important caveats to the qualitative–quantitative 
analysis. First, the relevant measure is not the absolute risk of relapse after 
returning to work. Rather, it is the relative difference in risks between a 
 
147 Lasser, 344 F.3d at 390. 
148 Colby II, 705 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2013). 
149 For example, approximately 90% of smokers who attempted to quit in one study eventually 
relapsed, with almost 80% resuming smoking within four months. Xiaolei Zhou et al., Attempts to Quit 
Smoking and Relapse: Factors Associated with Success or Failure from the ATTEMPT Cohort Study, 
34 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 365, 371 (2009). In contrast, only about 60% of those quitting heroin eventually 
relapse. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
150 Lasser, 344 F.3d at 391 (“[T]o require [the insured] to provide statistics detailing the harm that 
working in his regular occupation might precipitate—as the dissent would require—raises the bar too 
high.”). 
151 See id. at n.12. 
152 Id. at 398 (Garth, J., dissenting). 
153 Id. at 397. 
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return to work and a decision not to work: a person who has the same 60% 
chance of relapse with or without a return to work cannot claim benefits 
because working does not create any added risk to their health. Second, 
there are some jobs for which a high risk of injury is inherent to the job, 
such as a firefighter or coal miner. This risk of future injury cannot be 
considered a disability because it is compensated for through increased 
wages: a compensating wage differential.154 What is relevant is the 
differential risk of a claimant relative to her coworkers, because that is not 
compensated through wages. 
The reasonable person test advocated here is, in a way, both objective 
and subjective. Like the reasonable person standard common in tort law, it 
is objective in that it is “based on externally verifiable phenomena, as 
opposed to an individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions.”155 It asks, in 
short, what a reasonable person would do in the insured’s situation. The 
tort standard also takes into account specific characteristics of a defendant, 
such as intelligence and superior skills.156 The test advocated herein goes 
slightly beyond this to account for personal characteristics of the defendant, 
such as history of prior relapse and a family history of addiction; this level 
of subjectivity is more akin to tort law’s reasonable child standard.157 The 
reasonable uninsured person test takes these individual risk factors into 
account because they can significantly impact the likelihood of future 
injury. Failing to account for these differences would allow coverage for 
individuals with a low personal risk of future injury, and vice versa. While 
considering these factors will increase administration costs somewhat, the 
costs will not be large because many risk factors are easily discernible and 
data about them is widely available. Moreover, the test requires 
consideration of these individual factors only when they are readily 
available. By accounting for these individual characteristics, the test is 
somewhat subjective in that it is “based on an individual’s perceptions, 
feelings, or intentions.”158 In essence, however, the test is objective because 
it considers the hypothetical decision of a reasonable person, without taking 
into account the insured’s own feelings regarding a return to work. 
A final concern is the way in which quantitative and qualitative 
evidence will be admitted into the record for an administrative decision. To 
prove a disability, a claimant will need to present three types of evidence to 
the extent that they are available: evidence regarding the overall likelihood 
 
154 See Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 
52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116, 117–19 (1998). 
155 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (9th ed. 2009). 
156 Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in 
Intentional Tort Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV. 121, 140 
(1993). 
157 Id. 
158 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1561 (9th ed. 2009). 
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of future injury in her occupation given her health status, individual and 
family medical data, and evidence regarding the link between this data and 
the risk of relapse stemming from a return to her occupation. In general, 
claimants will simply be able to present their medical histories to the 
administrator along with data regarding the risk of injury; the insurer will 
likely present competing evidence. 
In some circumstances, expert testimony may be required to interpret 
complex or contradictory studies, as well as to detail the physical condition 
of the claimant. This type of expert testimony would not be radically new 
to insurance administrative decisions because currently a claimant’s and 
insurer’s doctors frequently testify regarding the claimant’s health.159 These 
doctors will now have to present widely available data—such as research 
published in academic journals—to support their claims, rather than simply 
a gut instinct about an insured’s chance of relapse. Although this could 
create a “battle of the experts,” which could sometimes cause a stalemate 
that a trier of fact has no reasoned way to solve,160 this problem will not be 
great when there is scientific data that the administrator can use to make a 
decision. Though research results can sometimes conflict, an administrator 
considering conflicting studies could simply weigh them to determine what 
a reasonable person would do. The flexibility of this test, which does not 
set a rigid percentage cutoff for coverage, allows the administrator to 
refrain from choosing between studies. 
D. Policy Considerations and Categorical Bars to Coverage 
To summarize thus far, a court or insurance administrator should 
determine coverage for risk of future disease by analyzing whether a 
reasonable person facing the risk without disability insurance would return 
to work. To determine this, it is necessary to consider the quantitative risk 
of relapse and the qualitative harms associated with relapse, including 
individual risk factors. However, the inquiry should not end there, because 
there could be other considerations that function as a categorical bar to 
coverage, meaning that an entire category of claims—such as claims for 
risk of substance abuse relapse—could be ineligible for coverage because 
of policy concerns. As a final step, the administrator should consider 
whether there are any important policy concerns that bar coverage for a 
particular category of risk. 
Courts often take policy considerations into account when interpreting 
insurance contracts, and are especially wary of interpretations that will 
create perverse incentives or lead to results that are detrimental to society. 
In particular, insurance policy interpretation often takes into account the 
 
159 See, e.g., Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 389–91 (3d Cir. 2003). 
160 Andrew B. Gagen, What Is an Environmental Expert? The Impact of Daubert, Joiner, and 
Kumho Tire on the Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 401, 
431 (2001). 
108:639 (2014) Future Harm as a Current Disability 
663 
concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection.161 In the context of risks of 
future injury, the primary moral hazard concern, identified in Part I.B, is 
that a claimant will untruthfully claim an inability to work. This concern is 
alleviated by analyzing the reasonable decision of someone without 
insurance. Although it is also possible that the claimant could be “faking” 
the risk in itself—claiming to have a 70% chance of relapse when it is 
really only 30%—this problem is solved by the use of scientific data and 
doctors’ testimony as evidence. 
Adverse selection—the tendency for those most at risk for a disability 
to purchase disability insurance162—is another concern in insurance 
coverage. Adverse selection arises when there is an information asymmetry 
between the parties that leads the insurer to underestimate the insured’s risk 
of future disability.163 The key moment for adverse selection is when the 
insurance agreement is entered. Adverse selection can occur when the 
insured is aware that she has a high likelihood of qualifying for benefits, 
but the insurer is unaware of this fact. 
It is unlikely that adverse selection could serve as a categorical bar to 
coverage for the risk of future injury. In general, adverse selection 
problems in health and disability are dealt with through underwriting—the 
process by which insurers evaluate the risk of potential clients, usually by 
requiring applicants to answer questions about their medical status and 
history.164 If materially false statements are made in response to these 
questions, benefits can be denied based on that misrepresentation.165 A 
categorical bar is necessary only where information is unobtainable through 
underwriting or where misrepresentation would not apply. 
Other policy concerns could impact categorical bars in various ways. 
Factors such as public health, the personal health of the claimant, and 
coverage consistency can either make a categorical exclusion more or less 
warranted. Finally, in the case of a risk of substance abuse relapse, some 
courts have held that the presence of a choice in relapsing can serve as a 
bar to coverage.166 This validity argument will be considered in Part III.C.167 
 
161 See, e.g., A.M.I. Diamonds Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 528, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2005); 
August Entm’t, Inc. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 919–20 (Ct. App. 2007); U.S. 
Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 890–91 (Fla. 2007). 
162 BAKER, supra note 34, at 6. 
163 See id. 
164 Peter Siegelman, Essay, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 
113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1248 (2004). 
165 See generally Thomas R. Foley, Note, Insurers’ Misrepresentation Defense: The Need for a 
Knowledge Element, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 659 (1994) (describing the defense of misrepresentation). 
166 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
167 See infra Part III.C. 
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E. Possible Criticisms of the Reasonable Uninsured Person Test 
There are two important counterarguments that could be made against 
the reasonable uninsured person test. First, under ERISA, a reviewing court 
must uphold a benefit denial unless it is arbitrary and capricious, or, 
equivalently, unreasonable.168 Therefore, this test creates a sort of double-
reasonableness problem, in which the reviewing judge must decide the 
reasonableness of an administrator’s determination of a reasonable person’s 
decision (regarding a return to work). How, then, is a judge to implement 
the test? 
Although this conjunction of reasonableness tests seems to present a 
linguistic maze, the job of the judge is actually quite straightforward. 
Application of the reasonable uninsured person test will proceed in the 
same manner as any arbitrary and capricious review with the judge 
determining whether the administrator’s decision was reasonable.169 In this 
case, however, the administrator herself will also have determined how a 
reasonable person would have acted in a situation. These two types of 
reasonableness are slightly different. In the initial benefit decision, the 
administrator will use evidence to determine what a reasonable person 
would do in the claimant’s situation. The judge, on the other hand, will 
look at the evidence to determine whether the administrator had a 
reasonable basis for denying benefits. Even if the judge does not agree with 
the administrator’s determination of the behavior of a reasonable person, he 
will uphold the administrator’s determination unless the decision itself was 
unreasonable. The judge’s job will be to assure that the administrator 
adhered to the test, weighed the evidence in a reasonable manner, and did 
not employ a categorical bar unreasonably. Although the judge’s job is 
slightly complicated by the need to apply reasonableness at two levels, 
federal judges are likely qualified to engage in these minor mental 
gymnastics. 
Second, this reasonable uninsured person test could impose large 
information costs on administrators, litigants, and courts due to its focus on 
scientific evidence and individual risk factors. But the evidentiary costs of 
the test need not be high. Claimants would need to present only widely 
available evidence regarding relapse rates and physician testimony. The 
specific risk implications of an individual’s circumstances would only be 
considered if there is evidence available; a lack of specialized evidence 
should neither help nor hurt a claimant’s case.170 On the other hand, a 
person claiming benefits for a risk of future injury would have to present 
 
168 See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
170 It is possible that this test would have the collateral effect of increasing the output of scientific 
research into injury and relapse risk, as claimants or, especially, insurers seek evidence for uses in these 
claims. 
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some evidence of a heightened risk—more than the unsupported 
physician’s testimony used today. 
III. THE REASONABLE PERSON TEST  
AND THE RISK OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE RELAPSE 
A. The Science of Relapse 
The risk of relapse into substance abuse is different for every 
substance and for every person, hence the need for evidence that is as 
individualized as possible. As an example, this Note focuses on the risk of 
relapse into opioid abuse by anesthesiologists. Aside from the probability 
of a relapse, the physical consequences of relapse are also a crucial variable 
in determining reasonableness of not returning to work. It is also important 
to look at any risk factors that may increase the likelihood of relapse; the 
presence or absence of these factors may impact the reasonableness of a 
claimant’s decision not to return to his occupation. 
Scientific evidence shows that, in many cases, the danger of a relapse 
can rise to a level that would prevent a reasonable person from returning to 
work. Addictions are associated with very high relapse rates; this is the 
reason that many consider addiction to be a lifelong disease that can only 
be managed, not cured.171 Relapse rates are highly variable, depending on 
factors such as the substance involved, physical and mental characteristics 
of the abuser, and environmental factors.172 In general, relapse rates range 
from 40%–60%, rates that lead many to characterize addiction as a chronic 
medical illness similar to diabetes or hypertension.173 
Although there are not reliable statistics regarding the general relapse 
rates for users of especially potent opioids such as Fentanyl (perhaps 
because abuse is relatively rare due to the difficulty in obtaining these 
drugs), multiple studies demonstrate that the relapse rates for users of more 
common opioids, such as heroin, are very high. One study found that 
relapse rates for heroin users after release from a treatment facility were 
approximately 60%, with most relapses occurring within thirty days of 
 
171 See, e.g., Stairway to Recovery, U. PA. HEALTH SYS., http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/addiction/
berman/treatment/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2014). 
172 See, e.g., Karen B. Domino et al., Risk Factors for Relapse in Health Care Professionals with 
Substance Use Disorders, 293 JAMA 1453, 1456–57 (2005). 
173 A. Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Dependence, a Chronic Medical Illness: Implications for 
Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 JAMA 1689, 1689 (2000). 
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release.174 Another study of long-term outcomes found that, years after 
treatment, abstinence rates were quite low.175 
Many studies examine the relapse rates of anesthesiologists upon a 
return to work because it is such a common problem. Of course, this will 
not often be the case with other professions—there are probably no studies 
examining the risk of relapse into opioid abuse by a return to work as a 
plumber. A claimant would not be automatically denied benefits in such a 
case—instead, the claimant would use more general evidence regarding 
risk of relapse into abuse of their particular substance, the effects that a 
return to full-time work may have on that risk, and any job-specific factors 
that may change this risk. 
One sign that a return to anesthesiology may create a high risk of 
relapse is the mere fact that so many anesthesiologists become addicted in 
the first place—an environment that spawns an initial addiction seems 
likely to be a fertile ground for relapse as well.176 There are multiple 
theories as to why anesthesiologists frequently become addicts. Factors 
leading to anesthesiologist addiction are “proximity to large quantities of 
highly addictive drugs, the relative ease of diverting particularly small 
quantities . . . for personal use,” and a high-stress work environment.177 A 
separate theory argues that small amounts of these substances can be found 
in the air in an operating room, causing sensitization to the substance.178 
Even if this theory does not in fact lead to initial substance abuse, it seems 
logical that physical exposure to small amounts of opioids could lead to 
relapse. 
Studies of relapse rates among anesthesiologists returning to work 
show that a return can be quite dangerous. Research findings vary, but 
generally paint a pessimistic picture, making the question of “[w]hether 
 
174 Michael Gossop et al., Factors Associated with Abstinence, Lapse or Relapse to Heroin Use 
After Residential Treatment: Protective Effect of Coping Responses, 97 ADDICTION 1259, 1262 (2002). 
“The sample [for this study] was drawn from clients from . . . residential [treatment] programmes who 
reported using heroin during the 3 months prior to treatment and who completed the post-treatment 
follow-up interview during the first 12 months of the study.” Id. at 1261. 
175 John Marsden, Long-Term Outcome of Treatment for Drug Dependence, 3 PSYCHIATRY 47, 48 
(2004). 
176 There is mixed evidence about whether anesthesiologists returning from an opioid addiction are 
more likely to relapse than physicians in other specialties. Compare Chet Pelton & Richard M. Ikeda, 
The California Physicians Diversion Program’s Experience with Recovering Anesthesiologists, 23 J. 
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 427, 430 (1991) (finding that anesthesiologists and other types of physicians 
were equally likely to relapse into opioid addiction upon return to work), with Emil J. Menk et al., 
Success of Reentry into Anesthesiology Training Programs by Residents with a History of Substance 
Abuse, 263 JAMA 3060, 3061 (1990) (finding a higher risk of relapse for anesthesiologists returning 
from an opioid addiction than anesthesiologists returning from other addictions). Both anesthesiologists 
and other types of physicians, however, face a very high risk of relapse. 
177 See Bryson & Silverstein, supra note 27. 
178 Mark S. Gold et al., Fentanyl Abuse and Dependence: Further Evidence for Second Hand 
Exposure Hypothesis, 25 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 15, 17, 20 (2006). 
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anesthesia personnel should be allowed to return to the operating room 
after successful treatment . . . highly controversial.”179 One study found that 
66% of those opioid addicts reentering anesthesiology relapsed,180 and 
another showed a relapse rate of 40%.181 A separate study of residents who 
became addicted to opioids during their training in anesthesiology found 
that only 46% of those that returned successfully reentered and completed 
training in the field.182 These different results can be explained primarily by 
methodological differences. Yet all of these studies suffer from the 
common shortcoming of measuring only the relapse rates of those 
anesthesiologists willing to return to work. It is probable that these people 
only returned because they thought themselves unlikely to relapse; those 
choosing not to return, conversely, probably thought that a return would 
lead them to relapse. Because these studies likely considered only those 
least likely to relapse, the risk of relapse of a random anesthesiologist 
addict is likely to be much higher. It is probably impossible to know the 
true rate of relapse; administrators will simply need to take this 
methodological concern into account when interpreting study results. 
Importantly, there is also evidence that the risk of relapse for those 
anesthesiologists who return to work is much larger than for those who 
choose not to and instead change their specialty or simply do not return to 
the medical profession.183 It is this relative risk of relapse that is relevant for 
the reasonableness analysis. One study showed that those returning to 
anesthesiology faced a risk of relapse approximately eight times higher 
than those who did not.184 Although this may in part reflect an endogeneity 
problem185 caused by the fact that those most likely to relapse are less likely 
to return to anesthesiology, it likely also shows a real danger in returning to 
anesthesiology. 
These studies also show that the qualitative physical risks of relapsing 
into abuse of potent opioids are extremely high. Any relapse into addiction, 
of course, leads to significant health problems. However, relapse into 
potent opioid abuse is especially harmful. In one study, death was the first 
 
179 Bryson & Silverstein, supra note 27, at 912. 
180 Menk et al., supra note 176. 
181 Richard T. Paris & David I. Canavan, Physician Substance Abuse Impairment: 
Anesthesiologists vs. Other Specialties, 18 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 1, 3 (1999). 
182 Gregory B. Collins et al., Chemical Dependency Treatment Outcomes of Residents in 
Anesthesiology: Results of a Survey, 101 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 1457, 1459 (2005). 
183 See Domino et al., supra note 172, at 1456. 
184 Id. 
185 An endogeneity problem occurs when the independent variable is correlated with the error term 
in a regression. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 848 (5th ed. 2013). Here, the independent variable (whether or not the anesthesiologist 
returns to work) is likely correlated to the error term (the difference between the measured effect on 
relapse of returning to work and the true effect) because a heightened risk of relapse may lead an 
anesthesiologist not to return. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
668 
sign of relapse for 16% of a large group of anesthesiologists returning from 
opioid addiction;186 in another study 9% of those reentering anesthesiology 
died due in part to relapse.187 Obviously, even a 9% mortality rate among 
returnees is extremely high, perhaps high enough to dissuade a reasonable 
anesthesiologist from returning to work. Because of the high likelihood and 
harm of relapse, many in the field argue that reentry should be allowed 
only on a case-by-case basis after closely considering an individual’s risk 
of relapse;188 others have even argued for a “one strike, you’re out” policy, 
meaning that a substance abuser should never be allowed to return.189 
Although the general danger of relapse is a good starting point for 
analyzing whether a reasonable person would return to work, it is important 
to also consider individual risk factors for relapse. Two people that worked 
in the same occupation and abused the same substance may have very 
different risks of relapse, depending on personal factors. The harm of a 
relapse could also differ between individuals if, for example, people with a 
certain gene or level of physical health are more likely to die from an 
overdose. A study of anesthesiologists has shown that the major factors that 
raise the risk of relapse include a family history of substance abuse and the 
presence of a coexisting psychiatric disorder; the presence of these factors 
together makes an opioid abuser thirteen times more likely to relapse.190 
This disparity shows that individual factors are as important as general 
relapse rates in determining reasonableness. 
Multiple studies show that relapse rates are significantly lower when 
returning anesthesiologists take part in a strict monitoring program in the 
workplace that includes procedures such as random urine testing, frequent 
behavioral assessment, and workplace surveillance.191 The presence or 
absence of such a program at the claimant’s place of work should be taken 
into account in analyzing the reasonableness of a nonreturn to work. 
This scientific evidence clearly shows that the danger of a return to 
anesthesiology can rise to a level that would lead a reasonable person to 
refuse to return to work, even without the prospect of benefit payments. It 
seems safe to say that a reasonable recovering addict would choose to 
avoid a situation in which the general risk of relapse is around 50%, where 
the claimant has risk factors that make her especially likely to relapse, and 
where approximately 10% of those who relapse die. For those with a lesser 
 
186 Menk et al., supra note 176. 
187 Collins et al., supra note 182. 
188 See, e.g., Bryson & Silverstein, supra note 27, at 912. 
189 See Wright et al., supra note 27, at 125. 
190 See Domino et al., supra note 172, at 1457. 
191 See id. at 1453; Michael R. Oreskovich & Ryan M. Caldeiro, Editorial, Anesthesiologists 
Recovering from Chemical Dependency: Can They Safely Return to the Operating Room?, 84 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 576, 579 (2009); TASK FORCE ON CHEM. DEPENDENCE, supra note 27. 
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risk, it will be up to first the administrator and then a judge to decide what 
is reasonable in a given situation. 
B. Public Policy and Substance Abuse Addiction Relapse 
The final step in the reasonable uninsured person test is whether there 
are policy concerns that require a categorical bar against coverage. Among 
the policy issues to consider are moral hazard, adverse selection, public 
health, and individual health of the claimant. This section analyzes the 
category of risk of substance abuse relapse claims in light of these 
concerns. 
As argued in Part II.D, concerns of moral hazard and adverse selection 
will rarely lead to a categorical bar in risk-of-future-injury cases.192 This is 
generally true within the category of substance abuse relapse as well. On 
the moral hazard side, there is a slight concern that the claimant could 
fabricate a risk factor such as a family history of addiction or a psychiatric 
disorder. Although the insurer will often be able to disprove such a 
fabrication, the possibility of this source of moral hazard weighs slightly in 
favor of a categorical bar. In terms of adverse selection, the claimant could 
have failed to disclose a heightened risk of initial addiction when the 
insurance policy was purchased. This creates an adverse selection problem 
in regard to coverage for an initial addiction. But insurers concede that this 
adverse selection issue does not create a categorical bar to coverage for 
addiction, which is clearly covered under these policies.193 It is therefore 
hard to argue that it should create a bar for the more remote risk of a future 
relapse. 
One argument against giving benefits for the risk of substance abuse 
relapse is that it creates bad incentives and rewards people for their 
mistakes. First, the availability of benefits for risk of substance abuse 
relapse eliminates a disincentive to engage in the behavior that can lead to 
an initial addiction. This is a moral hazard once removed from the 
disability at issue. But again, this is primarily an argument against coverage 
for addiction itself. It is unlikely that an anesthesiologist will be induced to 
begin using Fentanyl because of the availability of disability benefits for 
addiction; it strains credulity to believe that the availability of benefits for a 
risk of relapse will impact this decision whatsoever.194 
Second, some may balk at the prospect of providing benefits to former 
addicts who “got themselves into this mess.” Under this argument, 
coverage is unconscionable because it is “rewarding” people for their 
destructive decisions. But insurance is not meant to reward anything, and 
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benefit payments are not prizes for good behavior. Insurance is simply 
meant to transfer risk so that insureds are made whole following an 
unforeseen event, whether caused in part by the insured (e.g., surgery after 
a car accident) or not (e.g., flood insurance). Additionally, it is nonsensical 
under this argument to provide benefits for addiction but not for risk of 
relapse. This argument seems to stem more from the widespread 
stigmatization of addiction than from any reasoned analysis.195 
There is a third argument related to the health of individual claimants 
that counsels against a categorical bar. If benefits are granted to those 
addicts who continue abusing a substance, but not to those who have 
ceased abuse and yet are still unable to work, insureds that begin abusing 
drugs have a perverse incentive to continue the abuse. Although the 
Stanford court correctly pointed out that there are many other reasons for 
an addict to cease abuse,196 the loss of income will still provide a marginal 
disincentive to recovery. A primary goal of disability insurance is to allow 
for recovery and rehabilitation; a categorical bar against coverage for risk 
of relapse would undermine this goal.197 
Finally, there are public health reasons for providing benefits to 
anesthesiologists—and physicians in general—for a significant risk of 
relapse. If denied benefits, an anesthesiologist with a high risk of relapse 
may, due to financial constraints, be forced to return to practice.198 An 
anesthesiologist that relapses is a significant threat to the health of patients 
because their lives are in his potentially-drug-impaired hands. A substance-
abusing doctor could divert medications from patients and, if working 
while under the influence, could severely injure a patient or worse. One 
court has explicitly weighed this public safety concern against a benefit 
denial for risk of relapse.199 The threat to public safety from an 
anesthesiologist’s relapse should weigh heavily in favor of providing 
benefits for the risk of substance abuse relapse. 
C. Does Choice Matter? 
The policy considerations considered in the previous section do not 
require a categorical bar against coverage, but one important consideration 
remains: the idea that an addict has a choice whether or not to relapse. This 
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is a somewhat tricky issue. Basically, the contention made by insurers is 
that the risk of relapse cannot prevent an addict from working because the 
addict controls her own relapse.200 The issue comes down to causation: a 
return to work cannot cause a heightened risk of relapse if the cause of 
relapse is individual choice. 
There are three central reasons that the choice problem should not 
create a categorical bar to coverage. First, many addicts do not have a 
meaningful “choice” whether or not to relapse. There are two main models 
of addiction, each of which provide different insights into the degree of 
choice or rational action involved in drug use by an addict.201 The first is 
the disease model, which holds that addiction causes a “complete 
enslavement of the will,” and that there is effectively no choice involved in 
relapsing.202 This theory is supported by the fact that continuing in abuse is 
seemingly irrational and extremely self-destructive.203 The model holds that 
choices to ingest substances are not made rationally, and thus that addictive 
behavior cannot be changed through incentives. 
The other model is the economic model of addiction, which holds that 
addicts do, in fact, make rational decisions.204 This model is supported by 
studies showing that addicts do respond—at least slightly—to market 
forces such as tax increases or criminalization.205 Economic models of 
addiction are based on the assumption that as the addict begins to abuse a 
substance more and more, the effects of past consumption lead even a 
rational actor to enter a spiral of continued abuse;206 some also argue that 
addicts are hyperbolic discounters that weigh present utility much more 
heavily than future utility.207 
The disease model of addiction argues that addicts truly do not have a 
choice in relapsing. On the other hand, if the economic model is correct, 
the picture is much less clear. Although addicts under the economic model 
technically make rational choices, these choices are made under extreme 
pressures that push the addict into relapse—relapse is often the rational 
option.208 Furthermore, short-run incentive changes are very unlikely to 
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change the rationality of a relapse,209 and moral hazard through insurance 
benefits is almost nonexistent.210 
Second, voluntary choice affects many illnesses—both in initiation 
and maintenance—that are readily covered by disability insurance. Drug 
addiction disease is not set apart from other medical illnesses by the 
presence of choice.211 For example, hypertension can be caused by a 
combination of salt sensitivity—a genetic factor—and individual salt use 
patterns.212 Other chronic diseases such as heart disease and diabetes are 
intimately related to individual choices regarding diet, exercise, and 
monitoring.213 Disability policies cover these sorts of illnesses despite their 
choice component;214 the (limited) choice component involved in a relapse 
should not set it apart. The idea that addiction is a choice rather than a 
disease similar to hypertension probably stems largely from the widespread 
stigmatization of addiction in this country.215 
Third, the incentive structure of insurance means that even the 
presence of a true choice of future injury should not bar coverage. The 
economic fear of paying benefits for risk of “chosen” future injuries comes 
from the possibility that a claimant can claim to have a high risk of relapse, 
which is actually much lower because the claimant can control this risk. 
Yet the use of scientific data can show the actual risk; a high rate of relapse 
demonstrates that the claimant is not making a false threat. Moreover, the 
fact that a return to work can increase the chance of a claimant making a 
harmful choice can clearly be a disability. For example, consider a 
schizophrenic who, if exposed to the work environment, will engage in 
self-destructive behavior. There is a choice here, yet few would argue that 
schizophrenia is not a disability. Even if an anesthesiologist were able to 
truly choose whether or not to relapse, the mere fact that a return to 
employment would make the destructive choice much more likely should 
constitute a disability. 
CONCLUSION 
A fall into drug addiction and dependence is a life-threatening 
experience for any individual. On top of the health consequences of 
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addiction lie equally significant financial consequences—drug addiction 
often leads to a loss of employment. Thankfully for addicts, disability 
insurance provides benefits to those unable to work due to addiction. 
However, many insurance companies attempt to stop these payments once 
the addiction has been “treated” and the active abuse has ceased, regardless 
of whether the addict is able to return to work. Many courts have gone 
along with this, creating a circuit split. 
This Note provides a way for policy administrators and courts to 
analyze insurance coverage for risk of relapse into substance abuse and for 
all other risks of future injury: the reasonable uninsured person test. By 
considering the likelihood of relapse and the harm associated with a 
relapse, courts will be able to make coverage decisions based upon whether 
a reasonable person without disability insurance would return to work in 
the insured’s situation. The process is not easy on claimants because they 
will have to provide scientific data (if it is available) that sheds light on 
their personal risk of relapse. This test’s focus on individual risk factors 
may make the test harder to administer, and may make it more difficult for 
an insured to prove her case. Yet consideration of these factors will make 
the test much more accurate, and claimants will not be denied benefits 
simply because there is no data available. Although many claimants will be 
denied coverage under this standard, those who face grave danger from a 
return to employment will receive coverage. 
This analysis avoids the artificial line drawing and moral judgments 
that courts are currently employing in these cases. It also protects the 
central goals of insurance by supplying income to those who truly cannot 
work, preventing false claims by those who can, and encouraging the 
rehabilitation of those with serious illnesses. 
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